

VICKER

SAP Situation Report

Q4 2019

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ABOUT US

WE ARE VICKER!

- A company focused on securing the business-critical applications and its adjacent infrastructure (SAP, Oracle Siebel and others)
- All of our customers belong to the Fortune-500 Group
- We offer:
 - Oracle & SAP Penetration Testing
 - Cyber-Security Trainings
 - Vulnerability Assessment and Management
 - SAP Forensics & Many More!



CHAPTER 01

Introduction

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CHAPTER 04

Conclusions

A large black circle containing the text "THE AGENDA". "THE" is in a bold, blue, sans-serif font, and "AGENDA" is in a bold, white, sans-serif font.

**THE
AGENDA**

CHAPTER 01

INTRODUCTION

SAP Situation Report Q4 2019

INTRODUCTION



Mark of Reference

- This situation report, focuses on understanding the Internet facing SAP systems, and how these systems align to the status of SAP cyber-security in the current global market.
- We have analyzed the **Internet** facing SAP **Netweaver** systems, by applying **passive** discovering techniques, that allowed us to not only discover SAP assets (we only focused on web application servers), but their corresponding versions. It is important to clarify that ***NO active probes were executed on any of the detected systems. The collected information was obtained, by just analyzing the systems' metadata.***
- After the culmination of the data collection phase, our consultants compared the obtained SAP versions against a comprehensive set of SAP vulnerabilities (*disclosed by **SAP**, by **external** security researchers like **Vicxer** and private / semi-private vulnerabilities*)
- The **results** of this study will be divided in two, one section will contain the **worldwide** results, while the other, will outline the results per **continent**.

CHAPTER 02

GLOBAL RESULTS

Discovering Internet Facing SAP Systems



GLOBAL RESULTS



The Big Picture

**GLOBAL
SAP
SYSTEMS**

Currently, there
are more than
6339 SAP systems
exposed to the
Internet

Java
45%




ABAP
55%

* Only SAP Netweaver systems were considered for this statistic. Current ratio might be different for non-Internet facing assets

GLOBAL RESULTS



The Big Picture



GLOBAL SAP VERSIONS

Exposed Web
Application Servers
(WebAS)


* Versions correspond to SAP WebAS

GLOBAL RESULTS



The Big Picture

GLOBAL RISK
Risk was calculated in base of the systems' metadata. **No** active probes were executed




* Only SAP Netweaver systems were considered for this statistic


GLOBAL RESULTS



The Big Picture



37.86%



? 62.14%

GLOBAL SAP OWNERS

Identified institutions
/ companies behind
the assets

* To check if your company / institution is on this list and if it is at risk, please visit <https://vicxer.com/research/situation.html>



CHAPTER 03

CONTINENTAL RESULTS

SAP Results Sorted Per Continent


CONTINENTAL RESULTS



The Sum of Everything

SAP MAP



Distribution of
SAP Internet
facing systems per
continent



CONTINENTAL RESULTS



The Sum of Everything



**SAP
MAP**

Top 5 countries with the highest amount of SAP Internet facing systems

CONTINENTAL RESULTS



The Sum of Everything




Asia



Oceania



Africa



Americas



Europe

SAP MAP

SAP Internet
facing stacks
per
continent

CHAPTER 04

CONCLUSIONS



SAP Situation Report at Q4 2019



CONCLUSIONS



Project Results – An Objective View

- One-third of the detected Internet facing SAP systems, are currently affected by serious vulnerabilities that could allow a **remote** and **unauthenticated** attacker, to compromise **the target SAP systems**, and possibly perform lateral movement on the DMZ / adjacent network.
- Our team **could not find any evidence** that, **expensive solutions like IDS / IPS** systems would have a **meaningful** impact on stopping and preventing SAP intrusions (specialized SAP solutions will be tested on the next exercise)
- Firewalls **will not stop** most of the specialized attacks either, as the SAP web application server ports need to be open and unfiltered, in order to serve the valid users / customers.
- The main critical factors are caused by the customers inability (technical or political) to upgrade to a modern SAP version, in combination with the lack of a robust and **periodic** SAP patching policy.
- As a side result, it was possible to detect that some organizations are not just exposing **productive** SAP systems to the Internet, but **development** and **quality assurance** as well.

Follow Up Actions for SAP Customers

- Know your assets! more often than not, companies cannot tell exactly, how many SAP assets they own.
- If you haven't already, make sure your SAP assets are included in your general patching strategy. Appoint a technical champion to oversee the **progress** of this task.
- Ensure that all the SAP audit trails are enabled*
- Before investing in expensive SAP security products, perform a **quick SAP penetration test**, in order to understand where your SAP implementation stands in terms of cyber-security, and how it compares to similar sized organizations.

* <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ISa8lpSkHH8>

CONCLUSIONS



Follow Up Actions for Security Researchers

- We have the obligation to enrich the security of the organizations with **integrity**, **consolidated knowledge** and **empathy**, while avoiding the spread of misinformation, uncertainty and doubt.
- We need to **contribute more** to open initiatives like local meetups, technical gatherings and conferences, by sharing **novel**, **unbiased** and **relevant technical knowledge**.
- We must take a **unifying** role in the organizations running SAP, by being the nexus between the SAP team and the IT security world.

THAT IS ALL...



QUESTIONS?

To learn more about **SAP security**, visit us at <https://vicxer.com> or follow us on Twitter



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